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Abstract
Background: Autonomous cars could make traffic safer, more convenient, efficient and sustainable. They promise
the convenience of a personal taxi, without the need for a human driver. Artificial intelligence would operate the
vehicle instead. Especially deep neural networks (DNNs) offer a way towards this vision due to their exceptional
performance particularly in perception. DNNs excel in identifying objects in sensor data which is essential for
autonomous driving. These networks build their decision logic through training instead of explicit programming. A
drawback of this technology is that the source code cannot be reviewed to assess the safety of a system. This leads
to a situation where currently used methods for regulatory approval do not work to validate a promising new piece
of technology.
Objective: In this paper four approaches are highlighted that might help understanding black box technical
systems for autonomous cars by focusing on its behaviour instead. The method of experimental psychology is
proposed to model the inner workings of DNNs by observing its behaviour in specific situations. It is argued that
penetration testing can be applied to identify weaknesses of the system. Both can be applied to improve
autonomous driving systems. The shadowing method reveals behaviour in a naturalistic setting while ensuring
safety. It can be seen as a theoretical driving exam. The supervised driving method can be utilised to decide if the
technology is safe enough. It has potential to be developed into a practical driving exam.
Keywords: Deep neural networks, Autonomous cars, Validation
1 Introduction
At the moment research and development of autono-
mous cars is popular within the automotive research do-
main. It is possible that autonomous driving systems
(ADS) lead to a safer, more efficient, sustainable and
convenient traffic environment. It is assumed that driv-
ing becomes safer by avoiding crashes caused by human
error like driver impairment through distraction or fa-
tigue. Additionally travelling could become more effi-
cient and sustainable by offering easy car sharing and
avoiding traffic jams. This could be achieved by means
of better communication between ADS, other road users
and traffic infrastructure. Driving might also become
more convenient by relieving the driver of responsibility
and reducing effort by transitioning the role of a driver
to a passenger.
However, the road towards this future will not be easy.
On the one hand it is possible that ADS will reduce traf-
fic congestion due to a decrease of individually owned
vehicles and coordinated driving in platoons [34]. On
the other hand congestion could also increase in loca-
tions where driving is cheaper than parking [34]. Even
though humans are not the perfect drivers they are still
the best around. They are managing most situations
without crashes. ADS will have to catch up first. This
will take time and there are several technical challenges
that have to be addressed first. For example, while it
© The Author(s). 2020 Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if
changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons
licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons
licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain
permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
* Correspondence: fabian.utesch@dlr.de
Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V. (DLR) - Institut für
Verkehrssystemtechnik, Lilienthalplatz 7, 38108 Braunschweig, Germany
European Transport
Research Review
Utesch et al. European Transport Research Review           (2020) 12:48 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12544-020-00438-2
seems trivial for humans to recognise objects, it is a
fairly challenging task for computers. The main reason is
that object detection algorithms are based on appear-
ances which can be influenced by factors such as wea-
ther, scene illumination, sensor noise, occlusion and
object classes [20]. Driving a vehicle heavily depends on
visual information. It is possible to identify specific in-
formation about the environment by other means. For
example radar outclasses camera and eye vision of ve-
hicle detection in rainy weather. However, it has less se-
mantic information compared to camera images [5].
Laser scanners are well suited to measure the distance of
obstacles around a vehicle with high precision but lack
the ability to recognise semantic information like traffic
signs, traffic light status or intentions signalled by other
road users. Moreover, laser scanners remain expensive
compared to cameras and radars [5]. While driving, a
broad range of information can be collected by the range
of the electromagnetic spectrum which is visible to the
human eye. In fact, streets are designed to support navi-
gation within this visible range (e.g. traffic signs, lights
and street markings) of light because they are meant to
be perceived by the human eye. This is an advantage for
vision based systems and humans rely almost solely on
this channel to navigate through their environment, in-
cluding driving a vehicle.
Visual information is extremely complex and thus dif-
ficult to interpret. Still humans manage to identify a vast
range of objects, predict their movements, recognise and
interpret all different kinds of signs, even if these are
dirty, damaged or occluded. They identify driving related
objects, potential hazards and non-verbal messages from
other road users about their state and intention. Trans-
ferring these abilities to a computer has great potential
to collect the information needed by cars to drive fully
autonomous. Deep neural networks (DNNs) play an im-
portant role in achieving this vision. However they have
the disadvantage that the decision logic is hidden from
external review. This poses a new challenge: Assessing
the safety of this technology. If a computer should be
allowed driving a vehicle it needs to be safe. If the code
does not reveal the decision process, its abilities to han-
dle traffic situations safely need to be demonstrated in
another way. Finding a satisfactory alternative is a major
challenge in receiving regulatory approval for ADS.
There are many approaches, but there is a gap in pre-
dicting the ability of ADS to handle driving related tasks
outside of known situations. To address this, it is neces-
sary to show that ADS can react to the semantic class of
a situation independent from individual involved objects
and actors. We argue that it is possible to generate be-
haviour based models describing the internal processes
on a high level, revealing said abilities of ADS. In this
paper we propose the use of four alternatives to the
source code analysis to describe, understand and predict
the behaviour of DNNs. The presented ideas differ from
many existing approaches in that they are solely based
on behavioural experiments. They should be seen as
proposal for better understanding the actions of DNNs
and predicting the scope of its abilities. The presented
approach can be used as starting point to evaluate the
presented methods. Describing a complete behaviour
based regulatory approval process of DNNs is out of
scope of this work. Nonetheless, the regulatory approval
of ADS will be used as an example of putting the know-
ledge of behavioural modelling of DNNs to good use.
In the following, a brief introduction into DNNs and
their relevance for ADS is given. Then the idea of behav-
iour based testing to approach understanding black box
ADS is outlined. Four approaches to understand black
box technical systems for ADS are described next. Some
disadvantages of focusing on driven kilometres to meas-
ure the performance of ADS are presented. Finally, a
possible way to apply these four approaches is explained.
2 DNNs as key factor for autonomous driving
Recent advances in the application of DNNs make them
a promising technology for achieving ADS. Especially
computer vision is a task in which DNNs are superior to
classical information processing approaches. Their struc-
ture is fundamentally different to other computer soft-
ware and more similar to a human brain. While classical
software defines all possible decisions and actions in
source code, the code of neural networks mimics a brain
by defining virtual neurons that are connected in a net
structure. After the code is written, decision processes
and actions are generated by adding weights to the con-
nections through training of the network. Instead of
writing code that describes how the system works,
DNNs are written to learn by themselves by means of
training. The final challenge in safe ADS is to react in
the right way to any situation at any time [45]. DNNs
seem to be the best option to address this challenge.
Outside the automotive domain it was demonstrated
that DNNs can perform better than humans, for ex-
ample in lip reading [2] or games [11]. This is possible
because DNNs are able to take many aspects into ac-
count, even some that cannot be perceived by humans.
World class competitive gamers report that DNNs have
developed strategies that are superior to everything that
humans have thought of in their domain [27]. Some do
actually report that they learn from DNNs to improve
their skills in the field [12]. Looking back, computers
have surpassed human capabilities in challenges of in-
creasing complexity like Chess [28], recognition of hand-
writing [29], Jeopardy [19], Go [11, 12] and recently
StarCraft II [54]. Considering the pace in which this evo-
lution took place, it seems possible that DNNs might be
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able to even master driving in the real world. DNNs
seem well suited to do this since with proper training,
they develop their own strategies to solve problems. This
allows them to surpass the abilities of their creators.
The achievements of DNNs in other domains are
promising. However, driving on roads is much more
complex than playing games and the consequences are
more severe if something goes wrong [31, 55]. While the
playing field is well defined in Chess, Jeopardy or Go,
each situation on the road is truly unique. Additionally,
any error can cost lives. This puts high demands on the
accuracy of ADS. To ensure that these vehicles are safe
approaches are needed that allow assessing the capabil-
ities and limits of ADS.
The source code of DNNs does not indicate how the
system would react in a given situation; instead it de-
scribes how the system learns to function in the desired
manner. The decision logic is built by letting the system
learn from training material. Even though the meaning
of the training set is given by humans, the interpretation
of the given categories is built by the system. The logic
itself is deterministic in that it produces the same deci-
sion under identical circumstances. However, the sen-
sory input of driving in the real world is usually noisy
and very complex so that two situations that look exactly
the same to a human might look very different to a ma-
chine. Thus the system might react differently in seem-
ingly similar situations giving the impression of not
being deterministic. Since these decisions are expressed
implicitly in the connections of the neural net and not
explicitly in the source code, it is not possible to rule
out errors of the system like it can be done in other soft-
ware. There are efforts to get glimpses of the decision
logic. For example there are attempts to identify corner
cases for DNNs by generating test inputs [41, 52], visual-
izing what influenced a classification [7, 9, 56] and to
asses if a prediction can be trusted [43]. However these
approaches do only extend the list of specific cases that
the reaction to is known or show what influenced a deci-
sion. They do not predict the ability of DNNs to handle
certain types of situations, which is what is needed to
allow ADS to drive in real traffic.
3 Relevance of behaviour based testing
To receive regulatory approval it is necessary to show
that ADS are safe. The first step in this direction is their
validation. There are already efforts to develop tools that
measure the performance of ADS and quantify it in
comparison with other systems. For example, project
PEGASUS, funded by the German Bundesministerium
für Wirtschaft und Energie, had the specific goal to de-
velop tools to accelerate the regulatory approval of ADS
for the mass market [14]. It focuses on the approaches
virtual testing, proving ground tests, field tests and
decomposition [49]. Each method contributes its
strengths to generate a holistic view of the issue. The
presented approach here differs in that it focuses exclu-
sively on ADS that use DNNs, it strives to create a sche-
matic model of the function of these DNNs and it
focuses exclusively on working systems.
The analysis of not directly observable whole systems,
functions or elements of systems is part of the psycholo-
gist expertise since a long time. Many psychologists dur-
ing the fifties were focused on behaviourism. It
specialises on analysing, understanding and explaining
observable human and animal behaviour by objective
methods of science while assuming the brain is a black
box. Underlying cognitive or physiological mechanisms
were out of scope. Later on cognitivist psychologists de-
veloped behavioural experiments to analyse exactly these
underlying mechanisms and therefore to measure the
performance of the mind. Some of these methods may
be suited to evaluate DNNs of ADS.
There is indeed already a behaviour based solution to
evaluate the ability to safely drive a car: The driving test
for humans. The brain is basically a black box where the
decision logic is mostly unknown to the outside. It is ar-
guably unknown why drivers drive as they do and which
decision rules they follow. There are approaches to ex-
plain cognitive processes but these are models for hu-
man behaviour without actually seeing the algorithms of
the brain itself. The models are an approach to extract
these algorithms by approximation, which is the analogy
that is proposed here for ADS. The theoretical and prac-
tical driving tests were developed to evaluate the driving
skills of new drivers despite the fact that the human
mind is hidden from external review. Due to the differ-
ences between a human mind and a DNN a direct appli-
ance of the human driving test to ADS is unlikely to
yield the same effect. However, when adapted accord-
ingly, it could turn out to be a useful method for asses-
sing the functionality and safety of ADS. In the
following, steps to transfer the human driving test to the
context of ADS are outlined.
4 Alternatives to source code analysis
Static source code analysis is a common way to evaluate
the safety or correct function of software. This approach
does not work for DNNs because its source code does
not describe its input-output behaviour, but its learning
of making its own decisions which are not part of the
original programming. When reviewing the source code
is not an available option, there are at least four different
approaches that do not require a direct view on the deci-
sion logic. Each one is not exclusive, but instead should
be seen as complementing the others.
The experimental psychology method uses behavioural
experiments to create pragmatic models of the internal
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decision logic of the ADS to understand its function in
regard to traffic safety. Penetration testing utilises avail-
able information about the ADS to provoke errors with
as little effort as possible. This knowledge can be used to
understand the limits of ADS. It can also be utilised to
improve the system and make it robust against such at-
tacks. In the shadowing method the ADS is built into
cars, but not activated. The systems performance in
everyday situations can be observed without allowing
any real action. Its decisions can be compared to the
performance of the human driver to understand its cap-
abilities. Finally in supervised driving ADS are driving by
themselves in everyday traffic. They have to show that
they can react safely in any situation under natural con-
ditions. They are kept under supervision as failsafe
against errors.
These methods can be used to understand and im-
prove ADS (if they fail) or strengthen trust in their safety
(if they pass). Each method is presented in more detail
below.
When methods of experimental psychology are to be
applied on DNNs it has to be kept in mind that there
are many differences between human drivers and DNN
based ADS. Thus an adaptation of the testing procedure
makes sense. Both machines and humans do have key
advantages in regard to driving vehicles. Humans can
generalise. Humans only require around 30 h of driver
training to master the driving exam. However, at the
point of the exam humans already have about 16–21
years of experience navigating within the world and 10–
15 years of navigating in traffic as a road user. Even if
the previous experience is based on walking as a pedes-
trian or riding a bike, humans are capable of generalising
the learned rules to the new domain, like driving a car.
Traffic lights still regulate behaviour, lane markings still
mark the areas one is allowed to move on, signs still in-
dicate what rules have to be followed. Usually a few key
situations are enough for humans to be able to
generalize from. Machines have to be trained with vast
sets of right-wrong examples to derive a decision rule
that is still specific. Humans learn by observation.
Humans are able to learn by observation of others solv-
ing a problem. Machines are only capable of this in a
very limited way. Humans learn by instruction. Humans
can be given the decision rules directly (driving school),
instead of inferring them by trial and error. Technically
the same is true for machines. However the instructions
have to be much more specific for machines which limit
the applications.
On the other hand machines are fast learners. Due to
higher frequencies of processors compared to firing neu-
rons and higher signal speed compared to nerves, ma-
chines are able to speed up the simulation of situations
by several orders of magnitude. This allows them to find
the best way to handle a situation by trial and error in
time frames that are impossible for a human to match.
Machines can learn in parallel. It is possible to multiply
the code of a system to parallelise the learning process.
This enables machines to learn even faster or react to a
copy of itself to simulate interaction with another entity.
Machines do not get tired. While humans need to rest
to replenish their strength, machines are able to keep
learning in simulations for days, months or years, as long
as power and maintenance is provided. Machines can
copy knowledge. Useful abilities can be copied to new
machines. Also, DNNs can be stacked and an expert sys-
tem can be used as input for a higher level DNN deci-
sion system.
Self-driving cars do not have the same experience or
abilities as humans. They usually start from scratch and
have to catch up with all that a human has learned
already. However, machines do learn certain tasks much
faster than humans, can access a broader sensor battery
that is at least in parts superior to human senses and
utilise information from more sources than just five
senses. All these differences underline that the driver
test method has to be adapted to be utilised for ADS.
4.1 Understanding the system
At the moment ADS are still new and unfamiliar. How
can trust in such a system be gained when the known
methods are not suitable for testing it? The short answer
is to build it up over time. Long hours of observation of
real traffic can help to reach a level where the system is
able to drive in many different traffic situations. The first
step is to understand the abilities and limits of ADS.
4.1.1 Method of experimental psychology
To better understand DNNs and their behaviour a more
systematic approach can identify limits of ADS by mod-
elling its internal function. In this method the function
of ADS is modelled in experiments solely based on the
reaction to different stimuli.
Contrary to robots, human minds do not have a
known source code and their decision rules are not dir-
ectly observable. The brain is like a black box, its logic is
hidden to a human observer. There are imaging tech-
niques like electroencephalography (EEG), regular and
functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI, fMRI) or
positron emission tomography (PET) to observe the
brain. However these provide either a high temporal or
spatial resolution, but none of them both. Unfortunately
these neuroimaging techniques are not yet detailed
enough to understand decision processes. To compre-
hend, evaluate and predict human behaviour, psycholo-
gists developed behaviour based methods instead.
Experimental psychology strives to describe human
thinking by means of observation of the reaction to
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specific conditions. This is achieved by creating very spe-
cific tasks to learn about a function. The first step of the
model building process is the observation of behaviour
of the mind; an assumption is made and then tested.
The initial model is then extended by testing more as-
sumptions that are derived from what is already known.
Every step is documented, so that the procedure can be
replicated by anyone to verify the validity of the model.
This process is demonstrated in a simplified example
about understanding human memory.
Humans are capable of remembering information. If
asked, subjects are able to recall the information and
their origin from the last month. Apparently, there is
something inside the brain that is capable of retaining
information: memory. But humans also forget informa-
tion over time. This can be visualised in a very simple
model (Fig. 1).
Experimental psychologists conducted many experi-
ments to investigate memory, its capabilities and limits.
By learning nonsense syllables and documenting the for-
getting curve, Ebbinghaus found that most information
is forgotten immediately after learning. Information that
survived the first week can be retained for a long time
[16, 37].
To find out how much information can be stored, a
row of numbers was shown briefly and subjects were
then asked to recall it. People were able to recall be-
tween 5 to 7 words immediately [35]. The model of
short term memory can be enhanced accordingly.
The size of the short term memory indicates that a
row of numbers like 6 8 4 9 5 1 3 3 7 5 4 5 will almost
never be remembered fully without extensive learning.
However additional studies using different modes of
presentation revealed that altering the row to 684,951,
337,545 makes it much easier to remember completely
[10]. It is the case even though they are the same num-
bers, only grouped. This indicates that the same infor-
mation can be stored more efficiently if the meaning is
changed [35]. This process is called ‘chunking’ (Fig. 2).
By performing more studies changing the type, pos-
ition, occlusion, duration and presentation of stimuli
psychologists were able to create a sophisticated model
of human memory (Fig. 3). This was done without ever
being able to see the decision logic inside the brain. All
that was needed was a neat selection of the stimuli pre-
sented and the exact documentation of the reaction dur-
ing recall [3, 4]. Actually much more is known about
memory, but this simplified model shall suffice to dem-
onstrate the process of behaviour based learning about
hidden functions.
Even though it is unclear exactly how human memory
works, scientist were able to describe its function by
means of size, type and duration only by observing the
reaction in certain tasks. The resulting schematic model
is sufficient to make predictions about the abilities and
limits of human memory. Even shortcomings can be
predicted. The better the systems actions can be under-
stood, the better its actions can be predicted in hazard-
ous situations.
To give an example: A person will probably have a
hard time remembering a password of 12 random let-
ters, numbers and signs. But the same person should be
able to easily remember a password of 5 words like pony
– tantrum – headset – spring – spaceship [36]. Even
though the first password is shorter (12 characters) than
the second one (33 characters), the latter should be eas-
ier to remember, according to what is known about
memory. Incidentally, this would also increase the secur-
ity of the password since length adds more entropy than
increasing the vocabulary of allowed characters. It is not
necessary to look into the black box of the brain to draw
these kinds of conclusions. The same method could be
utilised to improve ADS or assess its safety.
The experimental psychology method can be adapted
to understand the function of DNNs. Like a human,
ADS can be presented with different stimuli to measure
its reaction. By clever choice of input stimuli the internal
processes of DNNs can be derived step-by-step and
compiled into a model. That is to say not the actual in-
ternal structure, but a high-level representation of rele-
vant processes.
For example investigating the processing of visual in-
formation could be realised through presenting driving
related objects (traffic signs, lane markings, other road
users and obstacles) with different levels of occlusion
and measuring the reaction of the system compared to
the expected behaviour (adapting speed, steering, swerv-
ing or braking). This would allow investigating the infor-
mation acquisition as well as the information processing.
It would be a viable option to assess the safety relevant
capabilities of a system.
To make statements about the safety of ADS it is ne-
cessary to predict its behaviour in a wide range of
Fig. 1 A very simple model of memory
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situations. Since it is impossible to test DNNs in every
possible situation, the logic of the decision needs to be
understood sufficiently well to extrapolate the behaviour
from a selection of situations. The reactions allow deriv-
ing abilities and limits of DNNs. They can then be im-
proved to avoid these mistakes in the future. The
method of the experimental psychology was used to cre-
ate a model of the human mind. It can similarly be used
to model the decision logic of DNNs. However, know-
ledge is gathered in small steps. It will take time to de-
sign and perform the experimental studies. Utilising the
advantages of machines over humans may accelerate
certain steps, but this process has to be developed first.
Additionally ADS are improved continuously. Not only
may ADS gain new abilities and handle situations better, it
is also possible that previously achieved abilities are re-
moved by a system update. This makes it difficult to assess
since they may change with every update. Due to this fact
an assessment for ADS can only be made for a specific
software version. While it may not appear feasible at first,
the development of paradigms to investigate specific ADS
abilities could decrease time and costs of applying this
method. This would also make it easier to retest newer
versions of the software with reduced effort.
4.1.2 Penetration testing
The safety of ADS can also be tested by trying to pro-
voke unsafe behaviour and use this knowledge to im-
prove the system. It has to be assumed that all kinds of
events could happen in real traffic. Thus it is important
to bring ADS to their limit even before bringing them
on the road. Penetration testing is already a common
practice in computer science. It is usually applied to any
kind of technology by individuals or research groups to
draw attention towards security or safety risks. The idea
is to think of an easy way to provoke a dangerous reac-
tion within a safe and controlled environment. Such “at-
tacks” can be directed to any point of the system. For
example a penetration tester could try to confuse the vi-
sion system of the vehicle by making changes to traffic
signs [18] or lane markings.
For example to test ADS reaction under the condition
of poor visibility, dirt, glare, occlusion, rain or wetness
can be reproduced relatively easy with tape, water, mud
or a flashlight. All these manipulations limit the sight or
distort the image. Weak spots can be identified by sys-
tematically varying the position and extensiveness of the
occlusion. The reaction reveals computer vision as well
as information processing capabilities.
Another attack vector would be to send false mes-
sages to ADS over car to x (C2X) channels or alter
the reflection of radar on vehicles. In any case they
must be able to cope with the situation, at least by
safely disengaging from the traffic. The better ADS
cope with the attacks, the better they will handle
themselves in other edge cases. This strategy is also
effective in hardening the vehicle against people with
malicious intent. An American car manufacturer has
Fig. 2 Model of memory with forgetting and chunking
Fig. 3 A more detailed model of human memory
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recently announced to actively support this kind of
safety and security research [15, 50].
Even though testing ADS under real conditions is pref-
erable because of the high validity, it is also cumbersome
and slow. A very fast alternative is simulating the sys-
tems input inside a computer. The development of
simulation based approaches that test behaviour of
DNNs in edge cases already exists. Pei et al. [41] have
developed a method to specifically target neurons of
DNNs by their activation function to find stimulus com-
binations that trigger an unusual behaviour by the DNN
and there are also efforts to specifically simulate adverse
conditions like fog or rain [52]. Another approach be-
tween simulation and reality is mixed-reality in which
virtual objects are injected into real world data perceived
by the ADS [13]. Such methods can help in identifying
weak spots of the system. If only the reaction towards a
situation is to be investigated a simulation based on
known positions of other road users would suffice [32].
If the object recognition itself should be investigated, a
photorealistic graphical input has to be provided towards
the system.
Aside from investigating the conditions around the ve-
hicle, the functions inside of the vehicle can be investi-
gated as well. Components can be deactivated or
disconnected systematically to better understand the sys-
tems functions inside the vehicle modules. This is im-
portant since the system also has to react safely when
some of its components are breaking down or are dam-
aged. Every weakness that is understood in this way can
be addressed to strengthen ADS.
Many companies do not appreciate such practices
since it can be viewed as exposing flaws in their
products and puts pressure on them. However, some
companies see this input as valuable contribution.
These companies explicitly hold hackathons in which
volunteers compete in a formal setting to find critical
vulnerabilities in their products [1]. The winners are
formally announced and either financially compen-
sated or receive the product as trophy. This approach
is well suited for improving ADS since it reliably
identifies vulnerabilities in a trusted environment. It
has a high objectivity and validity since the method is pub-
lished after the vulnerability has been fixed. It also has a
high practicality since the attack vectors are the same as if
the product would be out in the field. It can be applied to
any ADS. Independently of the official adaptation of this
method it is likely that independent groups will perform
penetration testing on ADS as soon as they are released.
Thus it is even more important that this method is applied
in a controlled environment as internal testing usually
done by subcontractors, institutional testing by research
facilities or public testing in form of the described
contests.
4.2 Building confidence in ADS
After thorough testing ADS have to go back to develop-
ment to be improved. The method of experimental
psychology and penetration testing can actually be seen
as a loop that needs to be iterated until ADS are as-
sumed to handle real traffic situations. When ADS are
understood well and assumed capable of driving on their
own, it is time to test their performance in actual traffic.
4.2.1 The shadowing method
This approach describes how ADS can be evaluated in
everyday life without jeopardising the safety of other
road users. The gained knowledge is utilised to train
DNNs for autonomous driving. ADS are implemented in
every aspect. But instead of letting them drive the ve-
hicle, the decisions of ADS are recorded. The record is
then compared to the actions of the human driver.
An example would be that a human driver exceeds the
speed limit and drives too close to another vehicle. Then
the other vehicle brakes and it nearly comes to a crash.
An unusual abrupt deceleration and proximity warning
could trigger the investigation of this incident from the
collected data. It is likely that the preceding high speed
and short distance to the other vehicle will be identified
as a contributing factor of the safety critical event. The
system was observing this situation and indicated for the
record that it would have driven at a lower speed with a
safe distance. While we cannot know if the safety critical
event would have been avoided by this action, this would
indicate that the system made the safer decision, com-
pared to the human driver.
The kilometres driven in shadow mode will be an indi-
cator about the abilities of the system. A possible mile-
stone for a high confidence would be when the
shadowing data shows that the system makes signifi-
cantly less errors than an average human driver. If ADS
decision were different to the human driver and danger-
ous, this would indicate that it still needs to be im-
proved. If the decisions are safe and similar to the
human over a long time and in many vehicles, the trust
in the system would grow.
This method is able to identify ADS behaviour in all
kinds of unknown situations without endangering any-
one. It can be applied in parallel on many vehicles to
speed up the process of training ADS. It is most effective
if applied in the setting of naturalistic driving studies [6,
17]. Here, common human drivers are considered in
everyday situations. Only when drivers are using ADS in
their everyday lives it is possible that no relevant situa-
tions are excluded. It has the advantage to keep the
training data as natural as possible, which grants a high
validity. This is actually done by original equipment
manufacturers (OEM) [21, 44]. Of particular interest are
the situations that are difficult for ADS to solve. They
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are rare and thus challenging to train on the street. Thus
it may be useful to stage these situations under con-
trolled conditions to improve ADS [39]. The sample
should be as large as possible, because the quality of the
trained DNN improves a lot the more data is used for
the training and safety critical events are scarce.
4.2.2 Supervised driving
In a driving test the capability to drive a vehicle safely is
measured and then based on the performance a driving
license is granted or denied. The basic idea of the super-
vised driving method is that a human driving test can be
adapted to be suitable for ADS. An original driving test
for humans in driving school (in Germany) usually looks
like this: After thorough training in driving related tasks
a driving test is taken. In it, the applicant has to drive a
vehicle safely under everyday conditions and the scrutiny
of the examiner. The applicant has to master every
emerging situation to pass the test. Since the exact test-
ing conditions are unknown, the applicant has to pre-
pare for all potential situations. An analogy could be
supervised driving of ADS. In supervised driving ADS
drive by themselves, but have a human as failsafe to take
over when needed.
Because machines are different from humans in many
aspects, the driving exam has to be adapted to cater the
specific needs of ADS. Humans are only allowed to have
a driving license if they have reached a minimum age,
are capable of driving a vehicle, were properly trained
and passed theoretical and practical driving exams [33].
How much supervised driving is necessary to prove
that ADS are safe? It is difficult to set a specific limit to
indicate the threshold of a machine driving better than a
human driver. A popular metric to compare ADS and
human driving are kilometres driven without interven-
tion, crash or death [33]. Maurer et al. [33] estimate that
approximately 6.62 billion kilometres need to be driven
to sufficiently prove the safety of ADS. Usually the
process has to be repeated if the system is altered. How-
ever there can be exceptions when the new system varies
only in minor aspects from the homologated system. If
these estimates are only somewhat true, it will take a lot
of resources to evaluate ADS. Several companies seem
to have understood the necessity of supervised driving to
achieve regulatory approval of ADS and are using it
already like Tesla [46], Waymo [30, 32] or Uber [24].
4.3 The value in testing abilities
The kilometres driven under supervised driving are not
all equal. The distance driven without incident can only
be representative for the situations that were covered
during the training. This means that distances driven in
an artificial or selected scenario are less valuable than
distances driven in unfiltered natural traffic. On the
other hand this means that any supervised driving that is
restricted within a certain private property, city or coun-
try can only be assumed valid or safe for this scenario
and not be generalised towards other areas. So it is not
just important to drive enormous distances without inci-
dent, but also all potential areas, that the vehicle should
drive in later, need to be covered. If ADS are supposed
to drive to every place this would mean it has to be
tested in natural traffic.
Driven kilometres also do not reflect encountered risk.
They could be complemented by reporting the covered
situations (e.g. intersections, roads shared by cyclists and
vehicles). A distance that was driven in known high risk
areas says more about the abilities of ADS than the dis-
tance driven on safe roads. A more extreme approach is
to put ADS in the most challenging situations to see if
they can handle them. This was the challenge of the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
ADS were competing first under tough environmental
[51] and later in urban conditions.
There are several examples of implementing super-
vised driving. Paid safety drivers are supervising ADS
performance on selected roads [24]. Customers use ADS
in their daily trips and supervise its performance [25,
46]. ADS are driving by themselves in selected areas, but
can be turned off if needed [30].
This work presented ideas for evaluating ADS with
black box components. Understanding the mechanisms
inside the black box could provide insight and build
trust in the general abilities of ADS instead of showing
that individual use cases can be handled. If we under-
stand the abilities of ADS to correctly perceive road
users, relevant infrastructure and objects then this would
increase confidence in ADS to deal with possible traffic
challenges. This knowledge is needed to avoid testing
ADS in any situation, but fewer selected traffic situa-
tions. The challenge is to identify the “core-capabilities”
necessary to handle all kinds of situations for ADS and
to develop new metrics to test them.
4.4 Applying behaviour based methods
Analogous to the prerequisites of granting a driving li-
cense to human drivers, ADS can be evaluated with the
presented methods. The method of experimental psych-
ology reveals ADS’ abilities and can be seen as indicator
of its level of performance. This is comparable to a hu-
man learning how to participate in traffic as a road user
before even taking any driving lessons. Only when it
reaches a certain level it is allowed to be observed in real
traffic. Penetration testing can identify vulnerabilities.
ADS need to be properly secured to reduce the risk of
crashes due to misperception or malicious attacks. This
method has no direct equivalent in the human driving
test. It seems that it is mostly assumed that drivers are
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able to assess situations accurately and deescalate if they
are finding themselves in a challenging situation. The
shadowing method can be seen as theoretical driving
exam. It shows if ADS are capable of driving a vehicle.
Supervised driving could be applied like a practical
exam. Only if ADS pass actual driving on their own
under natural traffic conditions are they allowed to do
so without supervision.
The suggested approaches are behaviour based to miti-
gate the fact that the source code does not indicate the
abilities of ADS. The end goal would be regulatory test-
ing to validate ADS and issue approval for road use or
not. It is out of the scope of this paper to describe this
process in detail since behavioural based ADS testing is
in a very early stage. Experimental studies are needed to
test if these methods are actually useful in evaluating
ADS. A first draft of integration into existing processes
could be as follows. The method of experimental psych-
ology can help in building a knowledge base of the cap-
abilities of ADS. The actual studies can be performed by
public or private research agencies. As long as the find-
ings are widely accessible and the possibility of replica-
tion is ensured regulatory agencies can consider the
knowledge in assessing ADS. This would be best
achieved by following the guidelines of Open Science
[38] and Open Access [47] to maximise public review
and quality of the research.
The same procedure could be applied for penetration
testing. In this case the requirements should include
public and open contests to identify vulnerabilities of
ADS. More research is needed to be able to say exactly
when the knowledge base is good enough to proceed
with regulatory approval. While the first two methods
can be applied independently of ADS manufacturer, the
shadowing and supervised driving method need to be
performed by the OEM since they control the vehicles.
The regulatory agency could require a certain perform-
ance in shadowing before allowing supervised driving.
The same could be required from supervised driving.
It is still unclear which performance indicator is well
suited for this task, but it should allow the appraisal
of ADS behaviour in natural driving conditions. In
this regard these methods differ from existing ones
like the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
(FMVSS) or the European New Car Assessment
Programme (Euro NCAP). These are investigating
performance in specific areas only. With ADS emer-
ging that regulate the complete driving task there is a
need for a tool framework that evaluates the whole
driving behaviour. The challenge in assessing whole
behaviour is to show that task like “recognising a stop
sign” work reliably under a wide range of conditions.
The presented methods can contribute to such a
framework.
There are exceptions in which the suggested methods
are not directly applicable. For example, the shadowing
and supervised driving method both require human
driver controls for their application. They may be suit-
able for classic passenger vehicles, but not for new con-
cepts of autonomous shuttles that do not feature any
human driving controls. A workaround might be to have
early prototypes with driving controls and remove them
later when ADS have demonstrated its abilities
sufficiently.
Seeing a machine primarily from its behavioural per-
spective is a concept that was recently taken up by Rah-
wan et al. [42]. Due to the inability to predict the exact
behaviour of DNNs from the source code, they suggest a
new branch of science, machine behaviour, dedicated to
study the behavioural impact of machines. The idea was
received with enthusiasm [22, 40]. At the moment
DNNs are mostly developed by computer scientists, en-
gineers and roboticists who are experts in building ma-
chines but not necessarily in evaluating behaviour. To
understand and predict the impact of self-learning algo-
rithms experts in experimental methodology, collective
behaviour, social theory and neuroscience are needed
[42]. Psychologists typically are experts in these areas
and could support evaluating machine behaviour. A be-
havioural evaluation of the driving skills of autonomous
cars could be a first step towards a science of machine
behaviour in the automotive area dedicated to achieve
safer and more convenient travels.
5 Conclusions
At the moment humans are still the best drivers we
know. Even though crashes are usually caused by
humans [48], they also handle a lot of situations without
causing crashes. ADS have to achieve at least human
level driving performance before they can provide a
benefit. This will take time due to the cost and the chal-
lenge to train a machine to manage all those situations.
Four ideas that could be used to evaluate ADS were
presented. They are suitable for testing any kind of black
box system including DNNs. The validation of ADS is a
necessary step to allow ADS unsupervised operation of a
vehicle in everyday traffic. The suggested steps can help
appraising the safety of the systems and ease the way to-
wards integration of ADS into everyday traffic. However,
experimental research is needed to evaluate if the
methods work. It is necessary creating a testing environ-
ment and evaluating the approaches and to work closely
with responsible offices to investigate if these methods
can be implemented in the regulatory approval or not.
Even if achieved one day, safe autonomous driving is
only the first step to participate in traffic. There are
more challenges that need to be mastered before ADS
are able to fully integrate themselves into everyday
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traffic. A main focus of current ADS seems to be to
drive on streets without bumping into others. However
this is only a part of driving. It does not cover pro-
actively supporting other road users in their goals. Not
always doing what is allowed but refraining from rights
to accommodate the needs of other road users. Often
road users find themselves in unfavourable situations.
Refraining from rights to support others helps to avoid
risky manoeuvres and keeping the traffic safe. Neither
do ADS communicate with other non-machine road
users. Reactions are slower than mutual understanding.
If a dangerous situation can be avoided by understand-
ing and negotiating each other’s goals, no risk mitigation
is necessary. There are ideas how to communicate with
other autonomous vehicles [23, 26], but successful ‘au-
tonomous vehicle to walking/riding/driving human com-
munication’ is very rare. At the moment ADS
development doesn’t seem to include anticipating the in-
terpretation of ones actions by other road users and
avoiding of unusual behaviour to not confuse them (e.g.
stopping too long even when having right of way, so
other road users assume they were granted way of right
and then starting to drive). There are examples to pre-
dict other road user’s behaviour [53]. However the infor-
mation basis for it seems to be based on distances and
speed, which allows only very limited predictions com-
pared to what sources of information humans utilize. Fi-
nally, current ADS seem to lack the ability to drive with
foresight: Understanding motivations and goals of other
road users enable humans to anticipate actions but also
reactions to the own behaviour. There are promising
steps in this direction [8]. However, at the moment this
ability to understand the world by taking another per-
spective is still in its infancy.
Humans avoid many crashes by not only thinking for
themselves, but constantly developing hypothesis about
the intentions of other road users. This allows them to
predict their behaviour and adapt their own actions ac-
cordingly. It requires a theory of mind. This is the ability
to see the world from the other’s perspective. Being able
to predict actions of other road users plays a huge part
in traffic safety. It will be interesting to see how ADS will
master this challenge or if human drivers have to adapt
to the shortcomings of the machines in the end.
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